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Pre-edited version of “Fichte and Schelling,’ in Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Über das Wesen des Gelehrten, 
Interpretationen und Quellen 4, Alfred Denker, Jeffrey Kinlaw, and Holger Zaborowski, eds. (Freiberg: Herder, 
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Fichte had lectured on the vocation of the scholar—or more precisely, morality for scholars-- in 
1794 at the beginning of his career in Jena; he returns to the theme on the occasion of his call to 
a professorship in Erlangen in 1805 and subsequently publishes them under the title Über das 
Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheingungen im Gebiete der Freiheit (1806).  He warns in a 
brusque preface that these lectures are published for the convenience of students who have not 
had the chance to hear them, that they are not presented as literary works, and that he has 
nothing to say to a reading public with whom he is increasingly disinclined to engage (GA I, 8: 
59)1.   Schelling, nonetheless, seizes upon the published text as the breaking of a long, self-
imposed silence on technical (wissenschaftlich) philosophy in a brief review that he uses as a 
preface to a longer review of this work and the subsequently published Grundzüge des 
gegenwärtigen Zeitalters and Die Anweisung zum seigen Lebens oder auch die Religionslehre.  
Schelling’s essay, Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der 
verbessertten Fichteschen Lehre: Eine Erläuterungschrlift der ersten (1806), extends the 
 
 1 J. G. Fichte, Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, hg. Reinhard Lauth & Hans 
Gilwizky, Werke Band 8 (Stuttgart-Bad Carnstatt:  Frommann  Verlag, 1991—hereafter cited as GA, I, 8.  
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somewhat subdued presentation of his own identity- and nature-philosophies made in 
Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1802) into aggressively polemical 
territory.   That both philosophers appeal to ‘Ideas’ or ‘the Idea of the Absolute’ to ground their 
ideas of the unity of human knowledge and/or the unity of morality indicates the common 
ground they shared from 1795 to the turn of the century.  That Schelling speaks of the unity of 
knowledge in the multi-disciplinary array of faculties in the university while Fichte speaks of the 
morality of scholars in the context of the human enterprise (“to come to freedom with reason”) 
indicates their fundamental difference in their approach to systematizing human cognition as 
transcendental idealism.  It would be difficult to reconstruct what the educated public made of all 
these essays, since it lacked the Ur-text : the Fichte-Schelling Briefwechsel, especially the 
exchanges of the years 1800-1802.  Intimates such a G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher were able to figure out Schelling’s side of ‘the difference’.  Fichte had not 
chosen to publish the texts of the presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/02 or the three 
Berlin lecture series of 1804, so Schelling’s invention of a silence on Fichte’s part about 
absolute- or first-philosophy had a certain plausibility—while it enabled Schelling to extend the 
public clarification of the views he advanced in the 1802 dialogue Bruno and the academic 
studies lectures about the unity of knowledge, the reach of absolute or objective idealism, and the 
methodology of the natural sciences.  The core contentions of Fichte’s Wesen des Gelehrten 
lectures and Schelling’s review of them are plain, nonetheless:  Fichte’s claim that Schelling 
prized a dead, mechanical nature over the life of spirit in his ‘idealism’ is met by Schelling’s 
counter-claim that Fichte had ever and always opted for a narrow idealism of human subjectivity.  
The presence of these clashing claims in the two sets of lectures on scholars, their calling, and 
their habitat almost obscures a fundamental commonality: following upon Kant’s Streit der 
3 
 
Facultaten, each seeks to enshrine philosophy as the university’s fundamental discipline, 
disputing the historical claims of sovereignty advanced by the professional or politically 
supported domains of law, medicine and theology, and seeking to block the growing ascendancy 
of historical and empirical-scientific  disciplines. 
 For the sake of simplicity, this essay will pursue a chronological path through four main 
items of discussion: (1)  the difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophies as 
reflected in the Correspondence of 1800-1802,  (2) Schelling’s remarks on the unity of 
knowledge and the difference between empirical science and Naturphilosophie in the academic 
studies lectures, (3) Fichte’s remarks on first-philosophy, nature and morality in the Wesen des 
Gelehrten lectures, especially the first two, (4) Schelling’s subsequent polemical response.  The 
overarching problematic is not whether human cognition is a system or can be rendered 
systematic in a philosophical construction—there is substantial agreement on that issue, the one 
which post-modern thought finds so problematic—but whether the freedom of the moral point of 
view or the objectivity of nature indicated by established scientific domains will furnish the 
paradigm for such a construction.  
____________ 
[1] Much of the Correspondence in the early months of 1800 is essentially political, concerned 
with plans to form a united front for the transcendental idealists and romantic writers living in 
Jena or Berlin.  When Fichte receives Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism after the 
fall book-fair, he comments to its author that he is wrong to oppose consciousness and nature or 
to provide separate constructions of them within that work.  Both writers had spoken of real and 
ideal activities and although they might contrast nature as real-ideal to consciousness itself as 
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ideal-real, the two activities are united in the I.  For transcendental philosophy, argues Fichte, 
nature can only be something found—finished, perfect, and intelligible to be sure, but shaped not 
according to its own laws but from the lawfulness borrowed from intelligence. Both nature and 
consciousness can be philosophically constructed only because philosophy performs a subtle 
abstraction—presumably from the I—and subsequently constructs transcendental or fictional 
accounts both of nature and individual consciousness (HkA III, 2, 1:  276; PRFS 42). 2 
 Schelling cannot accept this account: nature is not just ‘found’ intelligence, but 
intelligence that is productive and objective. While ordinary consciousness discovers intelligence 
in nature after the fact as something objective or merely found, transcendental (constructive) 
idealism finds it to be both productive and objective, a lesser derivative or potency of the 
transparently active productivity of consciousness.  He goes on to sketch two ways 
transcendental idealism might receive systematic shape, each with the 1794/95 Grundlage des 
gesamten Wissenschaftlehre as its foundation:  (a) philosophy as such, with physics and ethics, 
both in the broadest  Greek sense, and both founded on the above-mentioned abstraction and 
fictional construction of its concrete domains, or (b) a simpler parallel construction of nature and 
consciousness, both mirroring an essentially active intelligence, but the later starting where the 
former begins (HkA III, 2, 1: 279-281; PRFS 44-46).  Neither option is attractive to Fichte, for 
the former essentially concedes Kant’s charge that Wissenschaftslehre is mere logic, empty 
 
 2 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Historisch-kritische Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Breife 2, Briefwechsel 1800-1802, hg. Thomas Kisser (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 2010)—
edition cited hereafter as HkA.  English translation: J. G. Fichte/F. W. J. Schelling, Correspondence 1800-1802, in 
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence (1800-1802), edited 




tautology, while the latter gestures to a domain of reality beyond the reach of activity or the I’s 
self-positing. 
 Fichte drafts a reply that is slightly paranoid and significantly self-critical: the subjective 
[or the domain of the individual I] is indeed a construct and it is imported into philosophy’s 
object through an act of the imagination.  For all that, the I cannot be explained by that [nature] 
which it has itself explained or deduced. The real reason for Schelling’s apparent lapse into 
realism and for the muddled Spinozism of the romantic writers is not that objectivity has not 
received an adequate account in Wissenschaftslehre, but that the original check or limitation of 
activity implicit in its triad of principles has been left unexplained.  An account of the intelligible 
world is missing, and absent that the check is mere factical, or indeed a surd.  Hints in that 
direction are contained in the third book of the Vocation of Man, but they are mere hints (HkA 
III, 2, 1: 289-290; PRFS 48-49). Fichte’s actual reply is more anodyne:  while the principles of 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature do not follow from the published Wissenschaftslehre, an 
extension of its principles that locates some basis for intelligibility in nature might be found in an 
extension of its principles that seems to be demanded by the times.  Such an extension would be 
a ‘transcendental system of the intelligible world’; it would explain individual consciousness on 
the basis of a reality or limitation found in a noumenal nature—and so get around Schelling’s 
difficulty of wanting to explain  a phenomenal nature by a phenomenal consciousness and vice 
versa (HkA III, 2, 1: 287-288; PRFS 49).  Fichte’s conciliatory gesture is not fruitful, for 
Schelling takes the single word “extension” to imply that anything goes, and Fichte’s attempts to 
produce an account of the intelligible world seem to compromise the Kantian distinction of the 
transcendent and the transcendental. Indeed, the versions of Wissenschaftslehre penned in 
1801/02, 1804, and the popular distillation of those works in the 1805 lectures on the scholar all 
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prominently feature a divided ontology, a first-philosophy or ontology offered on its own 
merits—seemingly a transcendent metaphysics—and an appended phenomenology. 
 Fichte in fact offers a short version of this two-layer or two-world theory in a letter 
penned in mid-summer 1801.  It declares the philosophy must start from seeing, not from being, 
if it is transcendental or a matter of Evidenz, as one of Euclid’s postulates would be in geometry. 
It is not a matter of deploying a web of concepts, for concepts are placeholders or frozen 
intuitions.  A complete philosophy would have to explain absolute consciousness as in one sense 
a sum of individual consciousnesses, or in another sense, as a ground for all individual 
consciousnesses.  So Fichte calls the absolute or God at once the ideal ground of the identity of 
all consciousnesses and the real ground for their separation as individuals.  While 
Wissenschaftslehre can explain the universal form of I-hood and its relationship to absolute 
consciousness (namely as the relation of the determinate to the determinable), its moves are 
conceptual, while individual consciousness seems to be beyond description or 
conceptualization—with both its self-presence (or seeing) and the limitation of its individuality 
that it factically is forever escaping philosophical account.  If, as Fichte says, “being is—a seeing 
that is impenetrable to itself”, then this account embraces two impenetrables, that of God or the 
Absolute and that of individual consciousness in its limitation to individuality.  One can say 
(metaphysically, after Leibniz) that Wissenschaftslehre presents the universal form of the spirit 
world and that every individual is a particular point of view upon this system from its own point 
of view, but the missing point of individuation is available only in and through life, not through 
philosophy or genetic explanation (HkA III, 2, 1: 365-368; PRFS 56-58).   
 While much in the foregoing account is difficult or frankly unintelligible despite its 
author’s  use of arithmetic formulae and the analogy the geometer’s use of “self-evident” 
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postulates, it is clear that Fichte objected to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie because it began and 
ended with being, not seeing, that the activity imported into its account of the levels of dynamic 
process was imagined or fictive activity, and that life, if ever accessible to philosophy, was 
forever beyond the reach of this objective and objectifying philosophy.  Fichte eschews the 
labels of subjectivity and objectivity that Schelling comes to prefer after 1801 not because they 
tilt the game in Schelling’s favor, but because they have nothing to do with transcendental 
philosophy as he understands it, which is the genesis of an immediate comprehension of I-hood 
from the inside out, hence the necessary condition of experience.  “No consciousness without 
self-consciousness” is Fichte’s watchword. If a philosophy shifts the ground to what is 
experienced, as happens in the objective or absolute idealism of Schelling and Hegel, the warrant 
of the ‘transcendental’ pedigree is lost and philosophy increasingly becomes talk about 
everything from no particular point of view. 
_______ 
[2] Schelling uses the lectures on academic studies he delivered at Jena in the summer of 1802 to 
explain and defend the ‘real-idealism’ of the 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy, to 
defend his Naturphilosophie and to advance the claim that philosophy is the fundamental and 
unifying discipline in the contemporary German university.  While My System was written under 
the constraints of a promise  to not to go public on their disagreements and while the 1802 
dialogue Bruno made moves both polemical and conciliatory in antique disguise, both the 
exchange of letters between Fichte and Schelling and the underlying friendship they signified 
ended early in 1802.  Schelling was free to speak his mind, admittedly to a gathering of freshmen 
assembled in the summer months.   
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 Schelling was in fact rather slow in seizing the ground of his new so-called identity-
philosophy, since its initial presentations were heavily dependent upon historical models of 
earlier systems,  the Presentation upon a rather literal reading of the first two books of Spinoza’s 
Ethics, the Bruno upon a Neoplatonically costumed Spinozism in which talk of ineffable 
substance and its effable modes of mind and matter is replaced by more elegant and spiritual 
sounding  talk of eternal ideas seamlessly embracing both the infinite and the finite.  The first  
lecture of the academic  studies series adopts this talk of ideas and the Idea of the Absolute, but it 
is careful to express this idea in the context of the broader concept of knowledge as such: the 
immediate identity of the ideal and the real.  The geometer illustrates this general identity in the 
clearest possible manner, directly utilizing insight into the axioms and postulates that integrate 
the nature of points, line, figures and surfaces with three-dimensional space to organize the study 
of empirical lines, figures and bodies (SW V, 215-216; US 9-10).3  If knowledge is one, it must 
be so because it exists as one idea in the Absolute, and because we as human knowers are 
congruent with this single but all-embracing idea.  Lacking a productive relation to this 
archetypal unity, many of the neuter drones at work in the hive of learning produce but inorganic 
excretions, by which Schelling means the mass of professional skills and empirical aptitudes 
taught in the university which lack any orientation to the organic body of knowledge or the 
ability to reproduce themselves therein (SW V, 216-217; US 10-11).  But premature 
professionalism is not the only impediment to the university’s realization of the totality of 
 
 3 J. F. W. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, hg. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 Bd. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 
reproduced in Schellings Werke, Dritter Hauptband: Schriften zur Identitätsphilosohie, hg. Manfred Schröter 
(Münceh: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchandlung, 1927)—hereafter cited as SW.  English translation:  F. W. J. Schelling, 
On University Studies, ed. Norbert Guterman, tr. E. S. Morgan (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966)—
hereafter cited as US. 
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knowing; the call to action [-- heard everywhere in this revolutionary time, but especially in 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre--] is distorting and distracting.  Knowing and acting are not hard and 
fast opposites in the Absolute, nor empirical alternatives in life, for the Absolute exhibits a 
double movement: to image  its being in its form and resolve its form (or display) back into 
essence; in just such a way cognition and action mirror and reinforce each other in life (SW V, 
217-221; US 12-15).   Schelling is clearly critical of the influence of Fichte’s moralism and 
social activism in the university, but there is no hint of the gloves-off polemic and personal 
attack that Fichte’s Wesen des Gelehrten will provoke in 1806. 
 The eleventh lecture on the natural sciences defends the idea and fruitfulness of 
Naturphilosophie as a discipline that is at once above and alongside the disparate, particular 
sciences such as physics or chemistry.  Any complete account of cognition as such must start 
with its function in the Absolute, whereby the productivity of God is manifested as particular 
worlds or ‘ideas’, each of them organic and individual at the same time, all of them related 
because they manifest the singular divine reality. Life, productivity and internal relatedness are 
thus the characters of living cognition. Only because the law of the Absolute is to be self-
cognizing or its own object are ideas produced that completely manifest the divine essence, and 
only by resolving empirically disparate things into their idea does a genuine cognition arise (SW 
V, 317; US 115).  This process of manifestation of the universal in the particular and self-
recognition in the resolution of particulars back into the universal is further continued in the 
mirror relationship that hold between ideas and empirical particulars.  Ideas ensoul particulars 
and govern them either by inorganic forces such as gravity or magnetism, or by internal self-
regulation such as is seen in homeostatic systems or organisms, or by the self-cognizant self-
regulation which manifests as reason in the intelligent being (SW V, 318; US 116).  If cognition 
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is arrayed on a scale that runs from a knowing that makes the object extrinsic to the knower to a 
cognition that is internal, focused on itself and holistic,  two distinct approaches to the study of 
nature open up:  the empirical investigation of the particular which is the business of the 
particular scientific disciplines in their separations from each other and the philosophical 
approach which strives to reconfigure the particular in its origination from the ideas, and 
ultimately from the single Idea of the Absolute.  The spirit of modern physics is embodied in the 
philosophical (or anti-philosophical) moves Descartes makes to separate mind and matter, and to 
study the inorganic world apart from the organic, adopting the hypothesis of mechanism that 
change or movement can only origination in a communication of energy from outside (SW V, 
319-320; US 117-118).  The final product of the dualism inherent in this approach is the image of 
matter as intrinsically lacking life—just dead extended stuff: imponderable, weightless, 
unlimited, the ideal subject in a kingdom of death. 
 Naturphilosophie offers a distinct approach to the study of nature.  It is not opposed to 
empiricism as theory is opposed to experiment, for theorizing or hypothesis-formation and the 
testing of hypothesis by experiment are equally features of empiricism.  Philosophy offers the 
path of construction or construction in intellectual intuition; it represents the presence of the real 
in the ideal, or of the particular in the idea.  Particular forms replicate the universal movement of 
the imaging of the universal in the particular in the Absolute and the converse resolution of 
particulars back into the universal.  Mind is reconciled to nature only when it can recognize itself 
therein, or view nature as a living totality that is self-animated and self-produced.   The dead 
matter of modern physics is reconfigured as ideality or life itself in Naturphilosophie (SW V, 
320-325; US 120-123). –Fichte’s criticisms are not on stage in this discussion, but the contrast 
between a style of natural science that is grounded in the life of nature and not the dead stuff of 
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mechanistic materialism will be central to Schelling’s 1806 refutation of Fichte’s attack upon 
Naturphilosophie in Wesen des Gelehrten.   
___________ 
[3] In the first lecture of his 1805 series on academic life and conduct, Fichte begins his 
discussion of morality for scholars by contrasting natural human existence in the sensible world 
with a life oriented toward a higher, hidden ground—a ground of appearances, simply called the 
divine idea. The scholar is defined by this idea—that is what makes him a scholar—and by 
unreserved dedication to or love of the idea.  Of course the distinction between natural  existence 
and its ideal ground is artificial; at any moment, the idea is mediated by the culture of the era, but 
however much it is present or obscured by that culture, the scholar is defined by his unreserved 
love for the idea (GA I, 8: 64-65).  There is nothing technical nor philosophical in the locution: 
göttliche Idee.  It simply designates an intellectual as opposed to a sensible field for human 
endeavor.  But unlike other distinctions such as that of the learner as opposed to the 
accomplished scholar, love of the idea designates both the Was and the Wie of the scholarly 
calling. 
 The second lecture is devoted to a closer definition of this still obscure idea of a ground 
of appearances.  While Fichte excuses himself from the task of an exact or scientific derivation 
of the Idea’s traits here, he claims that a ‘feel for the truth’ should be adequate to motivate the 
acceptance of several propositions: 
• Being is simply and thoroughly characterized by life and activity; there is nothing dead, 
inactive, or imperfect about it. 
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• The sole living item is the life of God or of the Absolute; it is alive in itself, through 
itself, by itself. 
• The divine life is purely in itself, hidden away as it were, self-enclosed, without any 
alteration or change. 
• But the divine idea manifests itself, appears, presents itself—its presentation or 
concretion is the world. God presents godself as it can, while the divine idea remains pure 
and self-enclosed. 
• As much as the divine idea is simple, unitary and self-enclosed, its presentation (the 
entire life of humankind) is necessary an infinite unfolding or temporal process.  When 
the all-at-once of the idea is translated to the temporal order, life itself is to some extent 
negated, limited, put within constraints, or mixed with what is dead and lifeless.  Forced 
within limits, life in time manifests as a striving to transcend limitation (GA I, 8: 71-72). 
Fichte’s philosophical catechism is quite simple, unadorned by argument.  Three contrasts 
converge: appearance versus reality, life versus death, activity versus constraint or limitation.  
Fichte proceeds to identify the constraints of the above discussion with the objective, material 
world or nature.  Though nature has its ground in the divine life, its function is to be nothing 
other than a foil for the existence of another, ‘divine’ life in human endeavor.  Nature’s destiny is 
to be negated, to serve as means for human life.  Fichte then turns to sermonizing: 
 Do not be blinded or misled by a philosophy that appropriates the name nature-
 philosophy and thinks that it has surpassed all previous philosophy by making nature 
 absolute and tries to divinize it.  From time immemorial, all theoretical errors and all 
 practical corruptions of human ideals have been grounded in the tendency to steal the 
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 names being and existence and apply them to that which neither is nor exists, and which 
 sought life and the joy of life in that which intrinsically harbored death (ibid., 73-74). 
Several positive notes remain that need to be voiced, and Fichte exhibits them with great 
economy: 
• The human being can generally understand from the assumptions articulated above that 
there is an origin of and a cause for the temporal flow in which she lives, but there is no 
way to undo it or overleap all limitation, since reality and appearance, or the divine life 
and its temporal presentation are forever two, not one. 
• If one could gather all the fragments and pieces of the temporal display of life and 
reassemble them, one might understand how there can be reality and appearance, or how 
the display in ever-lapsing time translates the divine being. But that is counter-intuitive: 
the human knower and agent is itself part of time. 
• Recourse to experience is necessary to understand the current state of being, or where one 
is. Consciousness is oriented toward experience, and experience is embedded in the flow 
of time. 
• So thoroughly is the human being immersed in time and circumstances that have taken 
shape in time that the only way the human has of orienting herself in life is through the 
moral law. The transcendence of limits and the reacquisition, as it were, of the original 
life is a moral, not a cognitive imperative.   Educated reflection suffices to illuminate 
only what must be done with our freedom of action (74-76). 
The academy’s calling, then, is essentially moral; its leading disciplines, besides philosophy 
which alone can provide some theoretical illumination of the general truths that can be 
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understood, will be jurisprudence and religion or natural hierarchy.  When the arts and sciences 
are added, with their capacities to deal with details as well as the whole, the fundamental 
disciplines of the learned world will number five (79). 
 Other than to note how brief, intuitive, and unargued the above presentation is, we 
postpone comment until we consider Schelling’s reaction. Most reviewers of the printed version 
of the lectures considered this philosophical section of the lectures alone; Fichte’s 
recommendations of qualities such as application, diligence, and integrity are the standard stuff 
of academic virtue-ethics. 
_______ 
[4] Schelling’s reception of Fichte’s lectures on the morality of scholars falls into two parts: a 
brief review that appeared in the Jena Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, and a longer, overtly 
polemical review of all the popular works of 1806, including the Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen 
Zeitalters and the Anweisung zum seligen Leben.  Generally, Schelling takes the first two lectures 
of the Wesen des Gelehrten as a clue to his discernment of the other works, finding their contents 
to be clear, unambiguous—and self-contradictory. 
 The review takes the lectures to be Fichte’s “breaking of the multi-year silences he has 
maintained on his philosophical views,” takes note of the scornful comment addressed to the 
reading public in its preface, and wonders aloud why Fichte’s promised revisions of the 
Wissenschaftslehre have never appeared (SW VII, 4-5).  As far as his theoretical philosophy 
goes, Schelling isolates three of Fichte’s assertions: 
• All being is living and self-active; 
• The Absolute or God is life itself; 
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• The divine life is hidden in itself, self-enclosed and self-supporting.  It is all being and no 
other sort of being is outside it, 
but wonders what this can mean, since being is usually taken to mean the opposite of activity, or 
to entail the denial of possibility of activity (SW VII, 6).  Then comes the question of how any 
sort of particularized being can be added to the self-enclosed divine life:  either, as Jacobi 
paraphrased Spinoza, there can be no stepping-outside the Absolute or there will be some sort of 
emanation of an inferior sort of being, as the Neoplatonists envisioned.  Fichte seems to think 
that it is self-evident or at least non-problematic that there is some sort of stepping-outside or 
emanation, but Schelling doubts that Fichte was doing more than mouthing words at this point, 
since on his own assumptions, a Heraustreten des Absoluten aus sich selbst is unthinkable.  Is it 
essential that God manifest godself externally, or not essential? If essential, then the Absolute is 
conditioned, that is, subject to a law that it must produce this external display. The very idea that 
besides an absolute and unconditioned God there is necessarily a conditioned external display 
entails uncountable difficulties (ibid., 7).  There are difficulties too in Fichte’s stipulation that the 
Absolute’s Darstellung must take the form of a display that unfolds in endlessly lapsing time: is 
not the heart of the phenomenology that transcendental idealism teaches the view that time is but 
a subjective form of presentation, an ens imaginarium (ibid., 8)? 
 Schelling turns from Fichte’s account of what is to his account of what is not: nature.  
Since humankind pertains not to nature, but to God in some undefined sense, a negative factor 
must be introduced to account for it; this is the restriction or limitation that squeezes the fullness 
of being, as it were, into an elongated or progressive form, time.  Since Fichte lacks any idea of a 
positive connection between being and becoming other than purposiveness and the moral 
command, the negative idea of restriction (Hemmung) is made to do the work.  But a negative 
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account can do no positive work: to say that there must be a restriction so that an endless  
development can occur is like saying that worms lack eyes so that they can be blind (ibid., 9-10).  
Fichte pronounces nature dead, ignoring the implication that if nature involves the limitation of 
divine reality, it must have some element of reality to it.  Nature means objective reality, but how 
can a limitation, a subjective entity, produce something objective?  Furthermore, if nature is 
something dead and a product of a purely negative factor, how are Fichte’s initial assumptions 
about God, life and reality anything other than transcendent pronouncements, not merely 
assumptions made in the service of transcendental explanation?  Whatever else it can or cannot 
do, a philosophy that it supposed to explain the possibility of experience cannot start out by 
denying the validity of experience (ibid., 13-15). 
 Schelling then turns to Fichte’s ethical ideas, starting with “Fichte’s atheistic view of 
nature.” Since nature is but a restriction on human activity and an obstacle to the manifestation 
of divine life, the best that can be done with it is to instrumentalize it—turn forests into stools 
and other furniture, employ reason to transform nature’s flora and fauna into human 
conveniences, and behave as if there is no meaning in green woods rustling in the wind other 
than to serve as fuel to warm ‘rational’ beings (ibid., 18-19).  The artificiality of this purely 
economical view of nature is matched by the etiolated nature of the morality of duty that Fichte 
advocates.  What sort of people need to have a list of duties endlessly prescribed to it, especially 
when no guidance is given about how to resolve apparent conflicts of duty? And what kind of 
morality is produced by the dry prescriptive mode—anything more than the inept conformity to 
‘rules of style’ that an author with nothing to say, or with no acquaintance with truth or beauty, 
can produce?  Why not trust, instead, the life of a people, their sentiments, their ways of life, 
their common conscience (20)? 
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 Schelling expands upon most of these criticism at length, oftentimes with intemperate 
zeal, in the lengthy second part of his review of Fichte’s trilogy—an inverted Divine Comedy in 
which the lectures on the present age lead the reader through hell, to the purgatory of the 
scholarly life, and finally to the ersatz paradise of the ‘blessed life’ essay (SW VII, 87).  We 
must forego a lengthy treatment and merely state that most of the discussion is an elaboration, or 
a polemical amplification, of points succinctly made in the ALZ review.  Two items are new to 
Schelling’s critique, however, and deserve some attention: a short list of Fichte’s errors that 
Schelling uses to begin the longer discussion and Schelling’s own metaphysical reply to the 
divided ontology of Fichte’s second Wesen des Gelehrten lecture. 
First, the ‘syllabus of errors’, which we translate without comment: 
 Our present purpose requires only that we discuss . . . items that Herr Fichte has taught 
 and asserted:  
• a cognition of the in-itself or the Absolute is forever impossible for humans;  
• we can only know about  our knowing [Wissen], must start from it and remain 
within it;  
• nature is an empty objectivity, merely the sense-world; 
• it [nature] consists solely in the affections of our I, depends on incomprehensible 
restrictions within which the I feels enclosed, and is essentially irrational, unholy, 
and godless;  
• it is everywhere finite and completely dead; 
• the basis of all reality, of all cognition is the individual [persönliche] freedom of 
the human being; 
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• the divine can only be believed, not cognized; 
• this belief is solely of the moral kind, and if it contains more than what follows 
from the concept of morality, it is senseless superstition (SW VII: 21). 
For the second item, Schelling challenges the most difficult idea of Fichte’s second lecture, the 
contention that there is being or the divine idea or the divine life, but it is strictly in itself and 
unto itself, for we in our knowing and acting pertain to a different order where God has 
presented godself and become existence, external existence, the world—and where the divine 
life manifests itself as consciousness constrained by the flow of ever-lapsing time (GA I, 8: 71-
72). Schelling’s challenge is not merely negative; for that it would suffice to note that Fichte has 
cleverly hidden the chasm between being and phenomena or God’s Darstellung with his claim 
that we can understand the Daϐ but not the Wie of the cleft (ibid., 74).  Instead Schelling reaches 
back to line of thought initiated in 1802 which conceives God or the Absolute as self-realizing, 
the idea that is not just idea, but self-actualized idea. Schelling had changed his terminology 
slightly in his 1804 lectures on the Entire System of Philosophy, and Nature-Philosophy in 
Particular, where he views God as essentially self-affirmation, real or existent both as that which 
affirms and that which is affirmed—and so real and realized both in nature and in human reason 
(SW VI: 151-155).  Refining that view, Schelling now says that the divine reality is not only 
expressive or self-affirming, it is a band or bond [Band] between affirming and affirmed. 
 If in general what is is self-expressive and so self-knowing, as it is in the highest case or 
God, there can be no divide between being [Wesen] and expression [Form], or affirmation and 
affirmed.  Similarly there can be no divide between the one and the many, or between being and 
knowing, or between philosophy that comprehends being and nature-philosophy—for the one is 
replicated in the many, being is mirrored in knowing, and God is mirrored in and to that extent 
19 
 
present in nature (SW VII: 54-56). One who finds nature but an aggregate of lifeless items fails 
to see the one in the many, or the living unity of the many in the one item viewed-- one who, for 
instance, views bodies as inert masses pushed by incomprehensible external forces, not as a 
living field (gravity) where singular items (bodies) are relatively and temporarily distinguished 
(ibid., 57). 
 Ultimately there can be but two types of metaphysical theories—those that connect and 
those that divide.  Those that would view nature as a contingent collection of multiple items 
operate with relative concepts and are unable to transcend the fixed view that one and many are 
simply different, or that the infinite (God) and the finite (nature) somehow exist outside each 
other.  It is reflection, not reason, that approaches the primal unity of all and thinks it must solve 
an imagined problem of a cleft or chasm [Spaltung] between orders of things it does not know 
how to comprehend (ibid., 58).  Reason sees things in connected fashion, so it conceives of 
nature an eternal mirroring of the divine being and form in one another, the eternal birth of things 
in God and the resolution of all things back into God.  Nature is not the absence of God or the 
opposite of the divine life and to view it as such is to cast it into the abyss of incomprehensibility 
(ibid., 59). 
 
   
 
 
